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I. COVID-19: A GLOBAL PRESSING CONCERN
One year after officially declaring the COVID-19 pandemic, the
World Health Organization (WHO) has reported 146,841,882
confirmed cases and 3,104,743 deaths due to COVID-19.1 At the
* Dr. Nguyen Hong Thao is a Senior Lecturer at the Diplomacy Academy of
Vietnam (DAV) and National University of Hanoi (NUH). Dr. Le Thi Anh Dao is a
chief lecturer at the Hanoi Law University (HLU), Vietnam.
1. See WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on
COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/directorgeneral/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-mediabriefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020 [hereinafter WHO COVID-19 Pandemic
Declaration] (“We have therefore made the assessment that COVID-19 can be
characterized as a pandemic”); WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD
HEALTH ORG.,
https://covid19.who.int/?gclid=CjwKCAiA-_L9BRBQEiwAbm5fnqP2jKHuqTMq2E7gN1HJKEEGATLDkVJ2FTe2g6SE3_EwacuplTahoCo-UQAvD_BwE (last visited Apr. 26, 2021)
(providing updated COVID-19 mortality statistics); Qun Li et al., Early
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beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, nations failed to properly
respond to the outbreak through international cooperation, and
international health organizations were insufficient in managing the
crisis.2 Pandemics are not an unusual phenomenon in human history.3
However, the impact of COVID-19 on the international community in
regards to public health care, domestic and international economics,
the environment, human rights, domestic and international security,
international cooperation and others is highest in comparison to past
infectious viruses and diseases.4 The COVID-19 pandemic’s global
impact on every aspect of human life is a pressing concern for the
international community.5 The General Assembly resolution of April
2, 2020—Global Solidarity to Fight the Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19)6—recognized that the challenges presented by COVIDTransmission Dynamics in Wuhan, China, of Novel Coronavirus-Infected
Pneumonia, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1199, 1199–1207 (2020) (assessing the
transmission dynamics of COVID-19).
2. See Selam Gebrekidan & Matt Apuzzo, Covid Response Was a Global Series
of Failures, W.H.O.-Established Panel Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/18/world/europe/virus-WHO-reportfailures.html (explaining the failure of international cooperation); Eyal Benvenisti,
The WHO—Destined to Fail?: Political Cooperation and the COVID-19 Pandemic,
114 AM. J. INT’L L. 588, 588–89 (2020) (discussing the failure of the World Health
Organization in managing the crisis).
3. The first two decades of the 21st century have already witnessed several
epidemics and pandemics such as SARS, Dengue, Cholera, Ebola, H1N1, MERSCoV, Zika, Swine flu, and HIV/AIDS. Health Topics, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/health-topics (last visited Feb. 23, 2021); Lames W. LeDuc &
M. Anita Barry, SARS, the First Pandemic of the 21st Century, 10 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS
DISEASE
26
(2004),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3329048.
4. See Impact of COVID-19 on People’s Livelihoods, Their Health and Our
Food
Systems,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
(Oct.
13,
2020),
https://www.who.int/news/item/13-10-2020-impact-of-covid-19-on-people%27slivelihoods-their-health-and-our-food-systems (describing how COVID-19 has
caused devastating economic and social disruption); Kimberly Amadeo, How
COVID and Other Pandemics Affect the Economy, THE BALANCE (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://www.thebalance.com/coronavirus-plague-ebola-economic-impact-4795744
(noting how the global cost of infectious diseases like COVID-19 rise as the world
becomes more integrated while comparing COVID-19 to other recent and historic
infectious disease outbreaks).
5. See WHO COVID-19 Pandemic Declaration, supra note 1 (acknowledging
the heavy toll of COVID-19 and public health measures on societies and economies
throughout the world).
6. General Assembly Res. 74/270, Global Solidarity to Fight the Coronavirus
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19 “requires a global response based on unity, solidarity and
multilateral cooperation.”7
The obligation to protect human life is codified in several legal
instruments of international law.8 Principles of international law such
as sovereign equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and peaceful
settlement of disputes have guided the behavior of states and
international organizations through the exceptional circumstances of
the COVID-19 crisis.9 For example, sovereign equality implies the
equal access and distribution of vaccines among all nations.10 Equal
access and distribution of vaccines can be realized through the
initiative of global or regional vaccines funds or the removal of
intellectual property procedures in exceptional cases.11 The challenges
of the pandemic fostered a new debate for how existing principles of
international law should be interpreted and applied with flexibility, or
Disease 19 (COVID-19), U.N. Doc. A/RES/74/270 (Apr. 2, 2020).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art.
3 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of person”); G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 10 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR] (providing
for the protection of mothers and children from discrimination and exploitation);
G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6
(Dec. 16, 1966) (asserting the inherent right to life, which must be protected by law);
see also Constitution of the World Health Organization, art. 1, July 22, 1946, 62
Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter WHO Constitution] (declaring the objective
of the World Health Organization to be “the attainment by all peoples of the highest
possible level of health.”).
9. See U.N. Charter art. 2, par 1–4 (basing the United Nations on the principle
of sovereign equality and providing that all members shall settle their international
disputes peacefully and refrain from interfering with the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state); see generally Hans Kelsen, The Principle of
Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization, 53 YALE L.J.
207 (1944) (examining whether the principle of sovereign equality can be the basis
of international organization).
10. See generally Alex Ansong, The Concept of Sovereign Equality of States in
International Law, 2 GIMPA L. REV. 14–34 (2016).
11. See Karen Walsh et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Access in Crisis, 52
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 379–416 (2021) (examining the
importance of access to intellectual property rights (IPR) protected subject-matter in
two crucial areas – public health, and educational and cultural engagement during
the COVID-19 pandemic);
Covid: US Backs Waiver on Vaccine Patents to Boost Supply, BBC (May 6, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-57004302.
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developed in response to the current situation.12 Infectious diseases do
not respect international borders, and, in the era of globalization, a
global impact of a crisis requires global cooperation and coordination
of effective measures.13
Global infectious diseases have also unintended consequences for
international peace and security.14 In response to new challenges
imposed by outbreaks, international public health law should be
developed, interpreted, and implemented in a harmonious manner, to
the extent possible, with other relevant rules of international law15
related to human rights; the environment, international economy and
intellectual property, diplomacy, security and peace, responsibility
and so on.16
12. See generally Eric Richardson & Colleen Devine, Emergencies End
Eventually: How to Better Analyze Human Rights Restrictions Sparked by the
COVID-19 Pandemic Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 42 MICH. J. INT’L L. 105 (2020) (exploring how measures to contain the
spread of COVID-19 raise important questions of international human rights); Ingrid
Nifosi-Sutton, Human Rights and COVID-19 Responses: Challenges, Advantages,
and an Unexpected Opportunity, 24 HUM. RTS. BR. 18, 18–31 (2020) (arguing that
the pandemic should be addressed through implementation of a rights-based
approach).
13. See George Yip, ‘Does COVID-19 Mean The End For Globalization?,
FORBES
(Jan
8.
2021,
7:57
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/imperialinsights/2021/01/08/does-covid-19-meanthe-end-for-globalization/?sh=7511fa98671e (noting how the effects of COVID-19
are felt across the world’s economies and pondering whether the global impact of a
pandemic, such as COVID-19, portends the demise of globalization). But see Harold
James, Globalization’s Coming Golden Age: Why Crisis Ends in Connection,
FOREIGN AFF. (May-June 2021), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/unitedstates/2021-04-20/globalizations-coming-golden-age (arguing that after the
pandemic, “globalization will come roaring back”).
14. See S.C. Secretary-General Statement 14241, COVID-19 ‘Profoundly
Affecting Peace across the Globe’, Says Secretary-General, in Address to Security
Council (July 2, 2020) (asserting that the COVID-19 pandemic is “profoundly
affecting” peace and security across the globe).
15. Allyn L. Taylor, Global Health Law: International Law and Public Health
Policy, 3 INT’L. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. HEALTH. L. 268, 268–76 (2017) (describing
the advent and evolution of global health law and the significance of international
law to the codification of global health law).
16. See Shinya Murase, Epidemics and International Law, THAMMASAT UNIV.
L. S., 31–33 (Sept. 20, 2020) (Online lecture), https://www.cpg-online.de/cpgevent/online-lecture-on-epidemics-and-international-law/ (August 2020) (asserting
that because epidemics touch every facet of human life, they concern many
specialized regimes of international law); Claudio Grossman & Charles Jalloh,
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II. INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE OF PANDEMICS
The obligation of protecting human life must be a foundational
principle of international public health law for all states—affected and
non-affected.17 Global epidemics cannot fully be controlled without
the cooperation of the entire international community. Affected states
have a primordial, positive duty to guarantee the rights to health,
integrity, and life for the people living, traveling and working on their
sovereign lands and seas. Individuals—nationals and foreigners—
must voluntarily comply with local government efforts to prevent,
mitigate and control the nationwide outbreak in the name of public
health protection. For that purpose, in some states, like China,18
Vietnam,19 or Italy,20 individual rights may be temporarily suspended
to prevent the spread of a virus through rules on social distancing and
appropriate sanitation.21 The abuse of human rights to violate home
Protection of Persons from Epidemics in International Law, Proposal Draft for the
Long-Term
Programme
of
Work
of
the
ILC,
U.N.
DOC.
ILC(LXXII)/WG/LT/INFORMAL/2 (Sept. 18, 2020).
17. See WHO Constitution, supra note 8, art. 1 (providing that the objective of
the World Health Organization shall be the attainment by all peoples of the highest
possible level of health); U.N. Charter art. 2, p 1–4 (providing that member states
shall settle disputes peaceably and safeguard international.
18. China: Respect Rights in Coronavirus Response, HUMAN RIGHT WATCH
(January
2020),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/30/china-respect-rightscoronavirus-response; Zoey Zhang, China’s Travel Restrictions due to COVID-19:
An Explainer, CHINA BRIEFING (April 23, 2021), https://www.chinabriefing.com/news/chinas-travel-restrictions-due-to-covid-19-an-explainer/.
19. Thi Phuong Thao Tran, Thanh Ha Le, Thi Ngoc Phuong Nguyen, and Van
Minh Hoang, Rapid response to the COVID-19 pandemic: Vietnam government’s
experience and preliminary success, J. GLOB. HEALTH (December 2020),
http://www.jogh.org/documents/issue202002/jogh-10-020502.htm.
20. Alessandra Spadaro, Do the Containment Measures Taken by Italy in
Relation to COVID-19 Comply with Human Rights Law?, EUR. J. INT’L L. (March
16, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/do-the-containment-measures-taken-by-italy-inrelation-to-covid-19-comply-with-human-rights-law/.
21. See, e.g., Michael Conklin, The Most Demanding Test Known to
Constitutional Law: Do COVID-19 Bans on Church Services Satisfy Religious
Freedom Restoration Act Requirements?, 60 WASHBURN L.J. 63, 66 (2020)
(describing how the policy of banning large religious gatherings was supported by
public health experts to mitigate the spread of COVID-19); Alex Estroff & Boris
Gautier, First Amendment: Executive Order by the Governor Limiting Large
Gatherings Statewide, 37 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 197, 199 (2020) (noting that the federal
government outlined a series of recommendations and guidelines to help slow the
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isolations or for “publishing and spreading untrue information online”
that negatively affected on the government objective of the controlling
an outbreak for the interest of the whole community shall be
sanctioned. On the other hand, the public has a right to require that
rights-restricting measures are compatible with international human
rights and principles of transparency, due process, and fairness. In
other words, rights-restricting measures must ensure that the balance
of individual and collective interests are compatible with provisions
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and other related international instruments.
National right-restricting measures have only full effectiveness with
the wide comprehension, cooperation and support from states not
affected by a pandemic, especially from neighbor states and their
citizens. The cooperation and respect of right-restricting measures
posed by affected States are the best way to prevent the spreading virus
and to ensure an effective safeguard of life for nonaffected states’
citizens and economies. The spirit of cooperation allows overcoming
possible political doubts for achieving a common target to provide “all
peoples of the highest possible level of health”.22
International law must balance the principle of the sovereignty of
states,23 and the efficacy of the United Nations and WHO to achieve
two objectives. The first objective is to protect persons from infectious
diseases domestically and preventing the spread of infectious diseases
internationally.24 Secondly, international law must protect persons
spread of the virus, including staying at home, limiting travel, and avoiding
congregating in large groups); see also Interpeace, Peace and Conflict in a COVID19 World Implications for International Responses, 18 (Briefing Paper, June 2020),
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2020-CoVid-19-v4.pdf.
22. See Murase, supra note 16, at 60 (noting how states do not consider such
measures to be unfriendly acts, with their nationals living in, or traveling to and from
the territory of the affected state); see also Kemal Davis, Multilateralism: What
Policy Options to Strengthen International Cooperation?, BROOKINGS (Nov. 17,
2020) https://www.brookings.edu/research/multilateralism-what-policy-options-tostrengthen-international-cooperation/ (making the case for multilateralism in the
context of COVID-19 as a way to minimize the spillover effects the actions of some
countries have on others).
23. U.N. Charter art. 2, par 1 (providing that the United Nations is based on the
principle of sovereign equality); See generally Kelsen, supra note 9 (articulating the
principle of sovereign equality).
24. See WHO Constitution, supra note 8, art. 2 (describing one of the functions
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from the negative economic impact due to virus containment
measures, such as travel bans or temporarily closing businesses and
offices.25 The obligation to protect human life must be at the core of
all international public health law efforts to develop principles for
addressing challenges presented by a pandemic so that no person is
left behind.26
A common objective for states is to prevent and control pandemics;
and international cooperation must be present in all three phases—
before, during, and after—in order to achieve this goal.27 International
cooperation can be cooperation between neighboring states, strategic
alliances, or regional and international organizations.28 The United
Nations and WHO can foster international cooperation to combat
pandemics by issuing global standards on using surveillance,
notification, information-sharing, and public health response
systems.29 The United Nations should adhere to its Sustainable
of the WHO to be to “stimulate and advance work to eradicate epidemic, endemic
and other diseases”); Obijiofor Aginam, International Law and Communicable
Diseases, 80 BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG., 946, 947 (2002) (noting the
importance of international law in preventing the international spread of disease).
25. See Richardson & Devine, supra note 12, at 131–41 (discussing the legality
of travel bans and under virus containment measures under international law).
26. See WHO Constitution, supra note 8 art. 1 (providing that the objective of
the WHO shall be the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible health); U.N.
Charter art. 2, par 3 (requiring members to settle disputes in a manner that protects
international peace and security); ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 12, par 1 (providing
that “State Parties to the Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”).
27. See ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 11, par 1 (providing that state parties will
take appropriate steps to ensure the right of everyone to attain an adequate standard
of living and acknowledging the importance of international cooperation to that
endeavor).
28. See Gordon Brown & Daniel Susskind, International Cooperation During
the COVID-19 Pandemic, 36 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 64, 67–70 (2020)
(discussing the opportunities for international cooperation in the context of COVID19); Kaewkamol Karen Pitakdumrongkit, COVID-19 and ASEAN Cooperation: The
State of Play and Ways Forward, ASIAGLOBAL ONLINE (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/covid-19-and-asean-cooperation-state-playand-ways-forward (describing the cooperation between ASEAN member states in
combating COVID-19).
29. See U.N. Dept. of Global Comm., UN Mobilizes Global Cooperation in
Science-Based COVID-19 Responses, UNITED NATIONS (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-team/un-mobilizes-globalcooperation-science-based-covid-19-responses (reporting on the innovative crisis
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Development Goals by supporting developing states’ efforts to combat
pandemics with financial assistance, technological assistance, and
commercial facilitation.30 The WHO’s function and responsibility
should be respected,31 and states should implement the WHO’s
standards for addressing pandemics.32
International law must define the duties a state or international
organization owes to the international community to prevent
epidemics.33 The state affected by an epidemic must implement,
without delay or hesitation, the necessary measures to reduce the risk
of outbreak and prevent the spread of disease, and to seek external
assistance if necessary.34 A state or international organization offering
assistance to the affected state should be a legal duty, and not the
pretext to inter in the internal affairs of the affected state.35 An
internationally wrongful act can be attributable to an international
health organization if its conduct constitutes a breach of an
international obligation of that organization.36 A delay of the
response tools being deployed to help mitigate the effects of COVID-19).
30. G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development (Sept. 25, 2015).
31. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights &
World Health Organization, The Right to Health, Fact Sheet No. 31,
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/factsheet31.pdf
(summarizing
obligations on states and responsibilities to others towards the right to health); see
also OHCHR, CESCR General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12) Adopted at the Twenty-second Session of
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on 11 August 2000
(Contained in Document E/C.12/2000/4).
32. See generally Considerations for Implementing and Adjusting Public Health
and Social Measures in the Context of COVID-19: Interim Guidance, WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
(Nov.
4,
2020)
https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/considerations-in-adjusting-public-healthand-social-measures-in-the-context-of-covid-19-interim-guidance
(providing
guidance on mitigating the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic).
33. See, e.g., WHO, International Health Regulations, art. 5, par. 1 (2005),
https://www.who.int/csr/ihr/WHA58-en.pdf (providing that each state party must
develop, strengthen, and maintain the capacity to detect, assess, notify, and report
events).
34. Id. art. 13 (requiring state parties to develop the capacity to respond promptly
and effectively to public health emergencies and setting forth the obligation of the
WHO to provide assistance at the request of a state party).
35. See U.N. Charter art. 2, par 4 (providing that member states shall refrain from
interfering with the political independence of any state).
36. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International
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declaration of public health emergency of international concern
(PHEIC) can be considered deficient in responding a global crisis.37
Issuing a PHEIC on time is critical. It allows the WHO to require
immediate international actions and recommend suitable policies for
countries to respond.38 States have a legal duty to respond promptly to
a PHEIC.39 However, an early declaration of a PHEIC can waste the
world’s resources and money in an unnecessary way. A right decision
on a PHEIC must be based on the responsibility of the WHO and the
cooperation of states.
The delay issuing a PHEIC on the deadly SARS outbreak in 2003
that left 800 dead40 provided three lessons on the relation between the
international health organization and states. 41 First, the WHO must
work closely with affected and non-affected states to have additional
information on a regular basis for making PHEIC in time. Second,
transparency must be complied as a key factor in preventing the spread
of viruses. No state or international organization has a right to cover
up a possible global outbreak. Third, the medical response at the
national, regional and global level must be improved. An online
disease surveillance systems must be installed worldwide to
recognize, characterize, release and report information in real-time.
Organizations,
art.
4,
U.N.
Doc.
A/66/10
¶
87
(2011)
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_11_2011.pdf
(enumerating the elements of an intentionally wrongful act of an international
organization).
37. Atul Alexander & Anushna Mishra, Balancing Responsibility and Immunity
of the World Health Organization in Times of COVID-19, INT’L L. BLOG (May 26,
2020),
https://internationallaw.blog/2020/05/26/balancing-responsibility-andimmunity-of-the-world-health-organisation-in-times-of-covid-19/.
38. See Andrew Joseph, WHO Postpones Decision on Whether to Declare China
Outbreak a Global Public Health Emergency, STAT NEWS (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/01/22/who-postpones-decision-on-whether-todeclare-china-outbreak-a-global-public-health-emergency (reporting on the WHO’s
refusal to initially declare the COVID-19 outbreak a global public health
emergency).
39. Annelies Wilder-Smith & Sarah Osman, Public Health Emergencies of
International Concern: A Historic Overview, J. TRAVEL MED., August 12, 2020, at
1–13.
40. Joseph, supra note 38.
41. Kelly-Leigh Cooper, China Coronavirus: The Lessons Learned from the
SARS Outbreak, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-china-51221394.
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The WHO can support the development and equitable distribution of
the tests, treatments, and vaccines in high risk areas to reach the most
vulnerable populations at the right moments.42
Vaccines cannot be used as a political tool in international
relations.43 The COVID-19 crisis raises a new gap in international
health law from the lack of a legal and scientific definition of what
constitutes a pandemic, the revision of the procedure to declare a
PHEIC,44 and the lack of enforceable sanctions. The WHO should, in
consultation with member states and legal experts, develop clear
guidelines to interpret and implement consistently PHEIC criteria,
based on science, not politics.45 A state’s right to withdraw from
specialized international organizations during pandemics must be
balanced with its legal implications.46
42. What
is
the
ACT-Accelerator,
WHO
INITIATIVES,
https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/about (last visited July 30, 2021).
43. Richard N. Haass, The Politics of a COVID-19 Vaccine, PROJECT
SYNDICATE
(July
14,
2020),
https://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/politics-of-covid19-vaccine-by-richard-n-haass-202007; COVID-19 Vaccine: The Journey from a Global Necessity to a Political Tool,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (Mar. 05, 2021), https://www.firstpost.com/world/covid19-vaccine-the-journey-from-a-global-necessity-to-a-political-tool-9381311.html.
44. Emergencies: International Health Regulations and Emergency Committees
– Q&A, WHO NEWSROOM (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.who.int/news-room/q-adetail/emergencies-international-health-regulations-and-emergency-committees
(defining PHEIC as “an extraordinary event which is determined to constitute a
public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease and to
potentially require a coordinated international response. This definition implies a
situation that is serious, sudden, unusual, or unexpected; carries implications for
public health beyond the affected State’s national border; and may require
immediate international action.”.
45. Lucia Mullen et al., An Analysis of International Health Regulations
Emergency Committees and Public Health Emergency of International Concern
Designs, BRIT. MED. J. GLOB. HEALTH, May 2020, at 8.
46. Katie Rogers & Apoorva Mandavilli, Trump Administration Signals Formal
Withdrawal
From
W.H.O.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
22,
2020)
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-who.html
(reporting on the Trump Administration’s decision to formally withdraw from the
WHO); See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Trump Administration Will Redirect $62 Million
Owed
to
the
W.H.O,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
2,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/02/health/trump-world-health-organizationfunding-coronavirus.html (reporting on the Trump Administration’s decision to
withdraw from membership in the World Health Organization and to redirect $62
million owed to the WHO for 2020’s annual dues).
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The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) should utilize its core
functions when a pandemic threatens global peace and security.47 In
2014 the UNSC promptly adopted Resolution 217748 recognizing that
“the unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constitutes
a threat to international peace and security.”49 Additionally, in 2018,
the UNSC adopted Resolution 2439, which determined that the Ebola
epidemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo constituted “a
threat to international peace and security.”50
In 2021, the UNSC Resolution 2565 considered that “the
unprecedented extent of the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security.”51 The UNSC
demanded “that all parties to armed conflicts fully comply with their
obligations under international law, including international human
rights law, as applicable, and international humanitarian law, in
particular their obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
the obligations, as applicable, under the Additional Protocols of 1977
and 2005.” All parties to armed conflicts must “engage immediately
in a durable, extensive, and sustained humanitarian pause to facilitate,
inter alia, the equitable, safe and unhindered delivery and distribution
of COVID-19 vaccinations in areas of armed conflict.” The UNSC
Resolution emphasized “the unity, common origin and solidarity of
mankind, and the need for intensified international collaboration in the
face of the common threat of pandemics.” The UNSC Resolution has
supported strongly the effort of the UNGA, WHO, other international
organizations and states.
Economic restrictions and travel bans should not hamper the
delivery of medical supplies and the deployment of specialized
personnel to manage the pandemic.52 Unilateral sanctions and armed
47. See U.N. Charter arts. 24–26 (outlining the functions and powers of UNSC).
48. S.C. Res. 2177 (Sept. 18, 2014).
49. Id.
50. S.C. Res. 2439 (Oct. 30, 2018).
51. S.C. Res. 2625 (Feb. 26, 2021).
52. See COVID-19 Reports: Restrictions on the Export of Medical Products
Hamper Efforts to Contain Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) in Latin America and
the Caribbean, ECON. COMM’N LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN 1 (May 2020),
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/45511/2/S2000308_en.pdf
(describing how medical export restrictions have hampered the response to COVID19 in Latin America and the Caribbean); Andrea Shalal, WTO Report Says 80

1004

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[36:5

conflicts during pandemics are “contrary to international law,
international humanitarian law, the Charter of the United Nations and
the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among states.”53
For example, “collective expulsion” of foreign workers or
international students should be prohibited to avoid the spread of
diseases.54
International organizations must improve the principles of peaceful
dispute settlement between states.55 Stronger dispute settlement
principles
should
emphasize
international
organizations’
proportionality of responsibility and immunity and clarify state
jurisdictional responsibilities to the international community as a
whole.56 The COVID-19 pandemic produced disputes involving
public health, trade, labor, the environment, domestic & international
security, and intellectual property.57 Standing to bring a case before a
Countries Limiting Exports of Face Masks, Other Goods, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2020,
4:48 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-trade-wto/wtoreport-says-80-countries-limiting-exports-of-face-masks-other-goodsidUSKCN2253IX (reporting that, according to the World Trade Organization,
eighty countries and customs territories have banned or limited the export of face
masks, protective gear, gloves, and other goods to mitigate shortages since the
COVID-19 outbreak began).
53. SEE MOHAMMAD HADI ZAKERHOSSEIN, Economic Sanctions During the
Coronavirus Outbreak as a Crime Against Humanity, INT’L L. BLOG (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://internationallaw.blog/2020/04/08/economic-sanctions-during-thecoronavirus-outbreak-as-a-crime-against-humanity/ (arguing that the imposition of
economic sanctions during the COVID-19 outbreak constitute a crime against
humanity).
54. See Nina Lakhani, US Using Coronavirus Pandemic to Unlawfully Expel
Asylum Seekers, Says UN, GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2020, 3:19 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/17/us-asylum-seekers-coronaviruslaw-un (reporting that the UN considers the summary expulsion of migrants and
asylum seekers because of the coronavirus pandemic a violation of international
law); Chile: Arbitrary and Collective Expulsion of Migrants Must Stop – UN experts,
U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. (May 19, 2021),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27103
&LangID=E (reporting that U.N. experts called on Chile to stop all plans to expel
migrants).
55. See U.N. Charter arts. 24–26 (describing the role of the UNSC in maintaining
international peace and security).
56. Id.
57. See COVID Vaccine Patent Waivers Divide EU Leaders, DEUTSCHE WELLE
(May 7, 2020), https://www.dw.com/en/covid-vaccine-patent-waivers-divide-euleaders/a-57464976 (noting the intellectual property issues at play in COVID-19
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dispute settlement body should be broadened to include interstate
organizations, international organizations, and states.
The cross-sectoral framework to combat pandemics has been
insufficient in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic.58 The crosssectoral framework has no consistent definition of what constitutes a
pandemic,59 finds no consensus on whether a common authority
should be allocated of full competence for managing global efforts to
combat pandemics,60 and insufficiently addresses the need to
harmonize international laws and rules in the common fight against
infectious disasters.61
To overcome those weaknesses and divisions, the world needs
prompt action. A new early-warning protocol for infectious diseases
should be formulated to the WHO.62 However, political aspects and
vaccine development); Robert Muggah, David Steven, & Liv Torres, We Urgently
Need Major Cooperation on Global Security in the COVID-19 Era, WORLD ECON.
F. (Apr. 23, 2020) https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/we-need-majorcooperation-on-global-security-in-the-covid-19-era/, (arguing that global security
cooperation is essential to containing COVID-19); Abigail Abrams, The Challenges
Posed By COVID-19 Pushed Many Workers to Strike. Will the Labor Movement See
Sustained
Interest?,
TIME
(Jan.
25,
2020,
12:46
PM),
https://time.com/5928528/frontline-workers-strikes-labor/ (reporting on the labor
implications of the COVID-19 pandemic).
58. See Jeanine Becker & David B. Smith, The Need for Cross-Sector
Collaboration, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 1 (Winter 2018),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_need_for_cross_sector_collaboration (describing
“cross-sector collaboration” as a means by which the nonprofit, government,
philanthropic, and business sectors can use their diverse perspectives and resources
to jointly solve societal problems and achieve shared goals).
59. The WHO has not provided any affirmative criteria that could be used to
distinguish a pandemic from an epidemic.
60. Thomas J. Bollyky et al., Improving Pandemic Preparedness Lessons From
COVID-19 (Council on Foreign Relations, Indep.Task Force Rep. No. 78, 2020),
https://www.cfr.org/report/pandemic-preparedness-lessons-covid-19
(recommending that the UN secretary-general establish a global health security
coordinator and the United States work with partner nations to create a Health
Security Coordination Committee to facilitate a prompt and coherent multilateral
response to global health threats).
61. Anastasia Telesetsky, International Governance of Global Health
Pandemics,
AM.
SOC’Y
INT’L
L.
INSIGHTS,
Mar.
2020,
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/3/international-governance-globalhealth-pandemics.
62. Peter Gluckman & Alexander Gillespie, WHO Reform: A Call for an EarlyWarning Protocol for Infectious Diseases, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 19, 2020, 8:00
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sensitive areas in the global governance of pandemic response are
beyond the WHO’s main function of issuing technical guidelines on
how to respond to a health emergency to national governments. A
global pandemic preparedness and response based on international
cooperation and coordination should be engaged by the highest
political level through the form of a treaty.63 In that sense, the UN
Sixth Committee—the primary forum for the consideration
of LEGAL questions in the General Assembly and the International
Law Commission—the legal subsidiary body of the General Assembly
play a primordial role. A similar model can be learned from the
adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
drafted by the International Law Commission with the wide
participation of legal and scientific experts under the requirement of
the UNGA and supported by the UN Sixth Committee.

III. THE UNITED NATIONS SIXTH COMMITTEE
AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION:
ROLES IN PREPARATION OF A TREATY FOR
PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
The United Nations Sixth Committee and the International Law
Commission (ILC) should develop an improved cross-sectoral
framework to combat pandemics based on the lessons learned from
the COVID-19 disease and state practice.64 The Sixth Committee and
AM),
https://theconversation.com/who-reform-a-call-for-an-early-warning-protocol-forinfectious-diseases-148078.
63. See European Council Press Release IP 860/20, President Charles Michel of
the European Council, International Treaty on Pandemics (Dec. 3, 2020),
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/03/press-releaseby-president-charles-michel-on-an-international-treaty-on-pandemics/ [hereinafter
IP 860/20]; see also World Leaders Call for New International Treaty to Improve
Pandemic
Response,
UN
NEWS
(Mar.
30,
2021),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1088652.
64. See U.N. Charter art. 13, par. 1 (providing that the General Assembly shall
initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting
international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health
fields); International Law Commission, https://legal.un.org/ilc/ (last visited May 20,
2021) [hereinafter ILC] (noting how the International Law Commission was
established by the General Assembly, in 1947, to undertake the mandate of the
Assembly, under article 13(1)(a) of the U.N. Charter to “initiate studies and make
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the ILC could create a forum to discuss a new international legal
instrument focused on epidemics and pandemics.65 The Committee
could focus its debate on the role of international law in the three
phases of a pandemic—before, during, and after—and emphasize the
need to promote interaction and exchange of views between domestic
policymakers, lawmakers, and international organizations.66 This
forum is suitable for the exchange of views of national legal advisers
on a consistent legal-scientific definition of pandemics,67 new
international frameworks for global cooperation,68 supervisory bodies
for scaling and implementing those frameworks, and appropriate
recommendations for the purpose of . . . encouraging the progressive development
of international law and its codification.”); U.N., Sixth Committee (Legal), U.N.
GENERAL ASSEMBLY (last visited May 20, 2021) [hereinafter Sixth Committee],
https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/ (describing the Sixth Committee has the primary
forum for the consideration of legal questions in the General Assembly); Becker &
Smith, supra note 58, at 1 (discussing the importance of cross-sector collaboration
to solving complex challenges on an international scale).
65. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Protection of Persons in the Event of
Disasters, U.N. Doc. A/75/214 (July 12, 2020) [hereinafter Protection of Persons in
the Event of Disasters] (noting how many delegations saw the COVID-19 pandemic
as demonstrating the importance of multilateralism and international cooperation in
the area of disaster prevention and relief and considering “disasters” to include
pandemics). During the 75th session of the Committee, from October to November
2020, a series of relevant issues were addressed. These included: 1) item 85, the
report of the special committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the
strengthening of the role of the organization; 2) item 88, the rule of law at the
national and international levels [item 86]; the responsibility of international
organizations; and 3) item 89, the protection of persons in the event of disasters.
66. See Gian Luca Burci & Stefania Negri, Governing the Global Fight Against
Pandemics: The WHO, the International Health Regulations, and the Fragmentation
of International Law, 53 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 501, 512–21 (2021) (explaining
how COVID-19 confirmed the dramatic effects of health measures on many other
governance and legal regimes and prescribing a new governance model to address
pandemics by fostering international cooperation and coordination).
67. See Heath Kelly, The Classical Definition of a Pandemic is Not Elusive, 89
BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
540,
540–41
(2011),
https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/7/11088815/en/#:~:text=A%20pandemic%20is%20defined%20as,are%20not%20consi
dered%20pandemics (noting that the classical epidemiological definition of a
pandemic as “an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area, crossing
international boundaries and usually affecting a large number of people” omits
necessary information such as population immunity, virology, or disease severity,
thus limiting the effectiveness of the classical definition).
68. IP 860/20, supra note 63.
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measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic presently and in the
future.69 Those debates will promote the understanding of states’
stance on a new revision of the existing global mechanism, including
the WHO, for pandemic preparedness and response.
To facilitate the debate, the Sixth Committee can set up a working
group on pandemic preparedness and response. This formula was well
implemented when the Sixth Committee established a working group
on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts70 at
the 74th session of the United Nations. The working group could call
for an international conference to negotiate a treaty on pandemic
preparedness and response or ask the UN General Assembly to adopt
a resolution on the related issue.71 The Sixth Committee can request
the ILC’s service. The Commission demonstrated its concern to
improve international law in response to pandemics at the early
stages.72 In September 2020, Members of the ILC, Claudio Grossman,
Professor of Law at American University Washington College of Law,
and Charles Jalloh, Professor of Law at Florida International
University, proposed a long-term program on “Protection of Persons
from Epidemics in International Law” to the ILC.73 The Sixth
Committee can request the ILC to include the “Protection of Persons
69. See Burci & Negri, supra note 66, at 521–22 (articulating the failure of
existing international governance models in mitigating COVID-19 and suggesting
alternative governance models that would rely on early, regular, and mandatory
consultation on risk assessment and management, both within the WHO and
between the WHO and other international organizations and U.N. agencies).
70. G.A. Res. 71/133, ¶¶ 2, 8 (Dec. 13, 2016) (tasking the working group with
considering and providing a recommendation on the United Nation’s pursuit of two
options regarding the Article on Responsibility of states for Internationally
Wrongful Acts: (1) the negotiation of a convention based on the articles; or (2) the
adoption of the articles by the General Assembly, in the form of a declaration or
resolution).
71. See generally Stephanie C. Hofmann & Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, How
International Organizations are Stepping Up to Respond to the Pandemic, WASH.
POST
(May
4,
2020,
5:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/04/how-internationalorganizations-are-stepping-up-respond-pandemic/ (commenting on international
organizations’ ability to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic).
72. See generally Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, supra note 65
(noting the proposals made by ILC members to improve the development of
international law in the realm of disaster preparedness, including in the context of
COVID-19).
73. Grossman & Jalloh, supra note 16.
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from Epidemics in International Law” as a topic in its long-term work
and request a draft convention under Article 16 of the ILC Statute.74
The long-term program study should provide a framework for
developing cooperation among states and between states and
international organizations based on an analysis of existing
international law and procedures for the protection of persons in
epidemics.75 Draft articles on the “Protection of Persons from
Epidemics in International Law” developed by the ILC could be
combined with the draft articles for the “Protection of Persons in
Events of Disasters” and new conclusions from the work of Professors
Grossman and Jalloh on the topic.76 Draft articles should clarify the
key terms “epidemics,” “pandemics,” and “public health emergency
of global concern” under current international law. A new, precise
definition of pandemic should characterize a pandemic as a nonseasonal, quickly transmittable, widespread, and transnational
epidemic that affects the human well-being, economy, peace, and
security of the world in the short-term or long-term period, requiring
global cooperation to manage and eradicate.77
In compliance with the Commission’s mandate, draft articles should
focus on existing international law to identify a clear, comprehensive,
and coherent body of rules that address the prevention and control of
the spread of epidemic diseases including aspects of international
human rights law, international health law, international
environmental law and general international law. The Commission
74. See G.A. Res. 174 (II), Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 16
(Nov. 21, 1947) (codifying the procedure by which the ILC may develop
international law).
75. Id.
76. Id.; Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, supra note 65.
77. Nicole Wetsman, WHO Declares the Outbreak of the New Coronavirus is a
Pandemic,
THE
VERGE
(Mar.
11,
2020,
12:33
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/11/21156325/coronavirus-pandemic-whodeclares-covid-19-outbreak-global-h1n1(“A pandemic is the worldwide spread of a
new disease, according to the WHO.”); Pandemic, A Dictionary of Epidemiology
(Oxford University Press 2008) (“An epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very
wide area, crossing international boundaries and usually affecting a large number of
people.”); World Health Organization (@WHO), TWITTER (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://twitter.com/i/broadcasts/1YpJkQPBjLBKj; see also Peter Doshi, The Elusive
Definition of Pandemic Influenza, BULL. WHO (Mar. 31, 2011),
https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/7/11-086173.pdf.
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should analyze initiatives and recommendations of states, relevant
international organizations, and agencies.78
Draft articles would provide rules and guidelines for inter-state
cooperation, and cooperation with competent international
organizations in the three phases: prior to a potential pandemic,
during a pandemic, and after a pandemic occurs.79 The question of
state and international responsibility and the legal consequences for
failing to comply with international regulations on the international
spread of disease should be treated. A new draft convention would not
replace the IHR but focus on improving the obligation of information
sharing, transparency, and the independence and competence of the
WHO. The obligation of early notification of infectious disease threats
based on the experience of the 1986 Convention on Early Notification
of a Nuclear Accident could be developed. To enhance the
international pandemic response, the competence of the declaration of
PHEIC could be widely discussed. The combination of political power
of the UN Secretary General and independence of the WHO could be
a considered solution.
When the work of the Commission is finished, it can serve as a text
to negotiate a new treaty. The Sixth Committee could also propose that
the General Assembly convene a diplomatic conference to negotiate a
convention on the “Protection of Persons in Disasters and Epidemics”
or facilitate a treaty on pandemic preparedness and future responses.80
The new governance for pandemics preparedness and response
engages lex lata and lex ferenda issues. Therefore, the scope of draft
articles would depend on the competence that the General Assembly
accords to the ILC for a specific and urgent task.

IV.

VIETNAM’S RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19

78. IP 860/20, supra note 63 (“[A] number of areas such a treaty could address:
risk monitoring; better financing and coordination of research; a more efficient
system of alerts and information sharing; improving access to healthcare; resilience:
strengthening healthcare systems and securing supply chains.”).
79. Grossman & Jalloh, supra note 16.
80. See generally, Diplomatic Conferences, CODIFICATION DIV. PUBLIC’NS,
https://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/ (last visited June 6, 2021) (discussing
United Nations diplomatic conferences).
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PANDEMIC
Despite its shortcomings, international public health law can be
applied with flexibility to achieve positive outcomes in a pandemic.81
Vietnam’s innovative approaches to combat the COVID-19 disease
serve as a case study.82
In theory, Vietnam could have been heavily affected by the
COVID-19 pandemic due to its large population of 98,168,833,83
limited health care resources, and the fact that it shares a 1500km of
common border with China—the epicenter of the pandemic.84
However, as of July 2021, only 207 deaths have been caused by
COVID-19 in Vietnam.85 The initial results showed the effectiveness
of the Vietnamese Government’s policy on early preparedness and
prompt response, mass mobilization of the whole of society and
political system to support the health care system, transparency, public
communication and propaganda, cooperation and solidarity.
adaptation and good governance.86 This policy has been supported by
81. But see COVID-19 and Human Rights: We Are All in This Together, UNITED
NATIONS
3
(Apr.
2020),
https://www.un.org/victimsofterrorism/sites/www.un.org.victimsofterrorism/files/u
n_-_human_rights_and_covid_april_2020.pdf (discussing some of the limitations).
82. See Trang Nguyen & Dahn C. Vu, Summary of the COVID-19 outbreak in
Vietnam – Lessons and suggestions, 37 TRAVEL MED. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1
(2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7146658/pdf/main.pdf
(discussing the “lessons and suggestions” of Vietnam’s COVID-19 response); see
also Athira Nortajuddin, Vietnam’s Exemplary Response to COVID-19, ASEAN
POST (Apr. 9, 2020), https://theaseanpost.com/article/vietnams-exemplaryresponse-covid-19 (commenting on the efficacy of some of Vietnam’s COVID-19
response measures); Bui Thi Thu Ha et al., Combating the COVID-19 Epidemic:
Experiences from Vietnam, 17 INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. PUB. HEALTH 3125, 3125
(2020) (explaining that Vietnam’s strict containment measures are largely
responsible for reducing the country’s spread of COVID-19).
83. Vietnam Population 2021, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (June 2021),
https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/vietnam-population / (last visited June
6, 2021) (estimating Vietnam’s population).
84. Nguyen & Vu, supra note 82, at 1 (noting Vietnam’s proximity to China);
Nortajuddin, supra note 82 (discussing Vietnam’s response to COVID-19 in relation
news about the virus emerging from China).
85. WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, supra note 1 (keeping an upto-date record of COVID-19 deaths around the world).
86. Kris Hartley et al., COVID-19 Response in a Unitary State: Emerging
Lessons from Vietnam, 4 POL’Y DESIGN & PRAC., 152, 157 (noting six factors of the
Vietnam’s policy in response to COVID-19 pandemic: command-and-control
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the solidarity of Vietnamese citizens, who readily place aside personal
choices in favor of combating the pandemic.87
In combatting the COVID-19 pandemic, Vietnam has managed to
balance the principle of state sovereignty and compliance with the
competent authority’s professional guidelines for addressing
pandemics.88 As a state responsible to its population, Vietnam
undertook preparations to manage COVID-19 immediately in
December 2019 as rumors emerged from China about a new
respiratory disease.89 The border was closed three days after the
official announcement of the COVID-19 epidemic in Wuhan.90 By the
end of January, Vietnam decided to suspend all international flights

governance, extensive preparation, fostering cooperative sentiment and solidarity,
political readiness and communication, policy coordination, and adaptation); see
George Black, Vietnam May Have the Most Effective Response to COVID-19, THE
NATION (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/world/coronavirusvietnam-quarantine-mobilization/ (asserting that Vietnam may have the most
effective response to the COVID-19 because of mass mobilization of the health care
system, public employees, and the security forces, combined with an energetic and
creative public education campaign); see also Eric Zuesse, Coronavirus Lessons that
Vietnam Could Teach Americans and the World, MOD. DIPL. (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/12/08/coronavirus-lessons-that-vietnam-couldteach-americans-and-the-world (urging the United States to learn from Vietnam’s
COVID-19 response); Sen Nguyen, Vietnam’s Pandemic Success Is a Lesson for the
World,
GLOB.
ASIA
(Sept.
2020),
https://www.globalasia.org/v15no3/cover/vietnams-pandemic-success-is-a-lessonfor-the-world_sen-nguyen (urging the world to learn from Vietnam’s COVID-19
response); Minh Vu & Bich T. Tran, The Secret to Vietnam’s COVID-19 Response
Success, THE DIPLOMAT (Apr. 18, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/thesecret-to-vietnams-covid-19-response-success (reporting on ways in which Vietnam
has been able to “export its domestic success” through diplomatic channels).
87. See Nortajuddin, supra note 82 (quoting the World Economic Forum, which
noted that “being a single party state, with a large and well-organised military and
social services . . . [Vietnam] has been able to make decisions quickly and enact
them promptly”).
88. Cf. id. (noting that the World Health Organization reported that Vietnam’s
health ministry already issued COVID-19 prevention guidelines when China had
only just reported twenty-seven infections in Wuhan).
89. Hartley et al., supra note 86.
90. Julia Belluz, Vietnam Defied the Experts and Sealed Its Border to Keep
Covid-19 Out. It Worked, VOX (Apr. 23, 2021, 4:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/22346085/covid-19-vietnam-response-travel-restrictions
(“When China locked down Wuhan last January and bought other countries time to
react, Vietnam was one of only a handful of countries that used that time wisely.”).
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and close all international ports.91 This was not an easy decision,
considering that export trade with foreigners and tourist activities are
significant parts of the Vietnamese economy.92 The Vietnamese
government framed the virus as a common foreign enemy and called
on the unity of the population to defeat it.93 Further, the Vietnamese
government was highly transparent in providing information to the
public. Precautionary measures—such as the travel ban, social
distancing,
a
massive test-and-trace program,94
and
data
95
transparency —were implemented more than a month before the
WHO declared the COVID-19 pandemic a public health emergency.96
Like other countries, Vietnam had two contradictory goals: disease
control and economic development.97 In the beginning, Vietnam did
not hesitate to lock down the country in an effort to protect people,
identify sources of the virus, and prevent the spread of the virus.98 The
91. Thi Phuong Thao Tran et al., Rapid Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic:
Vietnam Government’s Experience and Preliminary Success, J. GLOB. HEALTH (July
28, 2020), http://www.jogh.org/documents/issue202002/jogh-10-020502.htm
(providing a timeline of Vietnam’s airline travel policies and regulations in response
to COVID-19); Phuong Bich Tran et al., Income Security During Public Health
Emergencies: the COVID-19 Poverty Trap in Vietnam, 5 BMJ GLOB. HEALTH *1
(2020) (adding that Vietnam also imposed a 14-day quarantine for individuals
traveling from severely affected areas).
92. See generally Tran Le Thuy, Vietnam is Fighting Covid Without Pitting
Economic Growth Against Public Health, GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/oct/20/vietnam-covideconomic-growth-public-health-coronavirus (discussing Vietnam’s strategies for
managing COVID-19 without sacrificing its growing economy).
93. See Belluz, supra note 90 (quoting the Prime Minister, who stated that
“fighting this epidemic is like fighting the enemy”).
94. Emerging COVID-19 Success Story: Vietnam’s Commitment to
Containment, Our World in Data, https://ourworldindata.org/covid-exemplarvietnam (last visited Feb. 24, 2021) (attributing Vietnam’s COVID-19 success in
part to comprehensive testing and tracing).
95. Anna Jones, Coronavirus: How ‘Overreaction’ Made Vietnam a Virus
Success, BBC (May 15, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52628283
(stating that there is overwhelming consensus from the medical and diplomatic
community that the government’s data is accurate).
96. The WHO declared COVID-19 a public health emergency of international
concern (PHEIC) on January 30, 2020. See Vu & Tran, supra note 86 (discussing
Vietnam’s response to COVID-19).
97. See Thuy, supra note 92 (discussing Vietnam’s twin goals of managing the
pandemic and maintaining its economy).
98. See Jones, supra note 95 (commenting on Vietnam’s rapid response
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first phase of Vietnam’s response was to protect human life; the
question of wealth and the economy would come later.99 Vietnam
focused on combating only the viral cases originating outside of the
country, once the spread of COVID-19 in the community was stopped
and placed under control.100 The government shifted its anti-COVID19 strategy towards targeted local lockdown and isolation, to the
maximum extent possible, in order to minimize the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on the production and exchange of goods.101 The
Vietnamese government’s objective was to protect the livelihoods of
the Vietnamese people, especially vulnerable populations so that no
one was left behind.102 In shortage of medical equipment and vaccines,
the Vietnamese government tried to ensure that Vietnamese residents
and foreigners living and working in Vietnam103 were equally
protected—demonstrating Vietnam’s respect for equality, nondiscrimination, and human rights.104 Vietnam made a great effort to
measures); see also Belluz, supra note 90 (using Vietnam as a paragon for explaining
that travel restrictions are effective).
99. Thuy, supra note 92 (“The motto for the first phase was that if we stay alive,
the question of wealth and the economy can come later.”).
100. See generally Luong Tran et al., The COVID-19 Global Pandemic: A Review
of the Vietnamese Government Response J. OF GLOB. HEALTH REPS., Mar. 2021
(discussing the phases of Vietnam’s pandemic response).
101. See Thuy, supra note 92 (commenting on the shift in Vietnam’s COVID-19
eradication strategy towards the economy).
102. See, e.g., Shaping Vietnam’s COVID-19 Response Strategy: From Pandemic
Repression to Recovery, THE WORLD BANK (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2021/04/01/shaping-vietnam-s-covid-19response-strategy (discussing some of the strategies employed by Vietnam to protect
the businesses and people most affected by the pandemic).
103. See generally Over 93,000 Foreigners Working in Vietnam, Vietnam + (Aug.
31, 2020, 10:16 AM), https://en.vietnamplus.vn/over-93-000-foreigners-workingin-vietnam/182136.vnp (asserting that over 93,000 foreigners have been working in
Vietnam as of August 2020).
104. See Oliver Barnes & Bui Thu, Patient 91: How Vietnam saved a British pilot
and kept a clean Covid-19 sheet, BBC NEWS (June 27, 2020)
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53196009,(“Prof. Khue insists everyone foreign or Vietnamese - had access to good quality care. ‘We focused on treating
sick people at the highest level, both in terms of facilities and human resources,
regardless of whether they were Vietnamese or from abroad.’”) Although these
services were free in the first stage of the pandemic, Vietnam now charges a
quarantine fee but has a plan to give a free vaccination for all residents and nonresidents when the country ensures the sources of vaccines from abroad and local
suppliers; see also When will foreigners in Vietnam receive COVID-19 vaccine
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develop its own vaccine in securing vaccine supplies during the
pandemic.105
States and international organizations must enhance and strengthen
international cooperation to respond to pandemics, such as COVID19.106 Vietnam is an example of effective cooperation with relevant
international organizations for the health public protection.
Longstanding recommendations of the WHO about pandemics
preparedness and IHR rules have been traditionally endorsed and
resiliently observed in accordance with Vietnam’s healthcare system.
Along with the WHO, Vietnam became the first country in the world
to successfully contain its SARS outbreak in 2003.107 During the first
phase of its anti-COVID-19 strategy, the Vietnamese government’s
diplomatic mission mobilized international support to the nation’s
efforts to combat the spread of the COVID-19 virus.108 The WHO,
together with other international partners, supported Vietnam’s
strengthening of its laboratory capacity for infectious diseases, as
required by the 2005 International Health Regulations (2005 IHR).109
shot?,
VIETNAMNET
(May
28,
2021,
3:24
PM),
https://vietnamnet.vn/en/society/when-will-foreigners-in-vietnam-receive-covid19-vaccine-shot-740843.html; Minh Vu, Vietnam to Vaccinate Foreign Diplomats:
Spox, HANOI TIMES (May 27, 2021), http://hanoitimes.vn/vietnam-plans-tovaccinate-foreign-diplomats-spox-317552.html (“We pay great attention to the
community of foreigners who are living, working, and studying in Vietnam.”).
105. Vietnam Starts Human Trial of Coronavirus Vaccine, FRANCE 24 (Dec. 17,
2020), https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20201217-vietnam-starts-humantrial-of-coronavirus-vaccine; Tomoya Onishi, Vietnamese COVID Vaccine Goes to
Final Trial, as Hanoi Lags On Shots, NIKKEI ASIA (May 13, 2021, 1:30 PM),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Coronavirus/COVID-vaccines/VietnameseCOVID-vaccine-goes-to-final-trial-as-Hanoi-lags-on-shots.
106. See generally Benvenisti, supra note 2 (highlighting the need for political
cooperation, not coordination, in achieving adequate global health).
107. Robert Roos, WHO: Vietnam May Defeat SARS, and World has Chance to
Follow Suit, U. MINN. CTR. INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH & POL’Y (Apr. 25,
2003), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2003/04/who-vietnam-maydefeat-sars-and-world-has-chance-follow-suit.
108. Lindsey M. Bier & Phillip C. Arceneaux, Vietnam’s “Underdog” Public
Diplomacy in the Era of the COVID-19 Pandemic, UNIV. S. CAL. CTR. ON PUBLIC
DIPL. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/vietnam’s-”underdog”public-diplomacy-era-covid-19-pandemic (discussing Vietnam’s contributions to
the COVID-19 eradication effort both domestically and internationally).
109. WHO Backs Viet Nam’s Laboratory Resources for COVID-19 Detection,
WHO (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.who.int/vietnam/news/detail/25-02-2020-who-
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In the second and third phases of its anti-COVID-19 strategy, Vietnam
maintained its domestic responsibilities of protecting its citizens and
assisted other states.110 Vietnam manufactured and donated shipments
of qualified medical devices to the United States and quick diagnostic
kits approved by the WHO, to twenty other states.111 Vietnam’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs donated $50,000 to the WHO COVID-19
Solidarity Response Fund112 and in the spirit of solidarity, Vietnam has
sent donations of medical equipment to support European countries—
specifically, England, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain—and
regional neighbors—such as, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and
Indonesia.113
Vietnam impressed as the ASEAN Chair and non-permanent
member of the UNSC for 2020 by promoting the international
response to COVID-19.114 ASEAN Leaders, under Vietnam’s
backs-viet-nam-s-laboratory-resources-for-covid-19-detection.
110. See generally Tran, et al., supra note 100 (explaining the phases of
Vietnam’s pandemic response).
111. See Vietnam Poised to Export COVID-19 Test Kits, VOA NEWS (Apr. 30,
2020),
https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/vietnam-poised-exportcovid-19-test-kits (noting that at the time, Vietnam was one of only five nations to
have COVID-19 test kits prepared for export); Bich Ngoc, 20 Countries, Territories
Order Covid-19 Test Kits Made in Vietnam, VNEXPRESS (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/20-countries-territories-order-covid-19-test-kitsmade-in-vietnam-4070785.html (reporting that twenty countries sought to purchase
thousands of the Vietnamese COVID-19 tests); Bich Ngoc, WHO Approves MadeIn-Vietnam
Covid-19
Test
Kit,
VNEXPRESS
(Apr.
26,
2020),
https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/who-approves-made-in-vietnam-covid-19-testkit-4090402.html (providing that the tests were to be exported first to Iran, Finland,
Malaysia, and Ukraine).
112. Game-Changers in Viet Nam’s Successful COVID-19 Response, U.N.
CHRONICLE (Aug. 30, 2020), https://www.un.org/en/un-chronicle/key-gamechangers-viet-nam%E2%80%99s-successful-covid-19-response.
113. Vietnam Donates Over 1 Million Masks to Europe and Southeast Asia,
Challenging China’s Monopoly on Coronavirus Diplomacy, REUTERS (Apr. 19,
2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3079380/vietnamdonates-over-1-million-masks-europe-and-southeast (referring to Vietnam’s
donations as a challenge to China’s “coronavirus diplomacy”); see also Ralph
Jennings, Vietnam Using Mask Diplomacy to Fortify Foreign Relations, VOA NEWS
(Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/vietnam-usingmask-diplomacy-fortify-foreign-relations
(discussing
Vietnam’s
“mask
diplomacy”).
114. Pankaj Jha, Assessment of Vietnam’s Chairmanship of ASEAN in 2020,
MODERN
DIPL.
(Nov.
10,
2020),
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leadership,115 have conducted four cyber summits in 2020—the
Special ASEAN Summit, the Special ASEAN Plus Three Summit on
April 14, 2020,116 the 36th ASEAN Summit on June 26,117 and 37th
Summit from November 12 to 15.118 The 26th ASEAN Economic
Ministers (AEM) retreat on March 10, 2020 issued a statement calling
for collective action to mitigate the impact of the virus, with a
particular focus on leveraging technology and digital trade, and using
trade-facilitation platforms for supply chain connectivity and
sustainability.119
At the Special ASEAN Summit on COVID-19, leaders of the
ASEAN member states issued the Hanoi statement calling for a postpandemic recovery plan and proposing the establishment of the
COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund.120 As of December 2020, the
ASEAN COVID-19 Response Fund received up to 10 million USD in

https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/11/10/assessment-of-vietnams-chairmanship-ofasean-in-2020/.
115. Hoang Thi Ha, The Coronavirus Could be Vietnams Biggest Stress Test in
its
ASEAN
Chairmanship,
THE
DIPLOMAT
(Apr.
9,
2020),
https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/the-coronavirus-could-be-vietnams-biggeststress-test-in-its-asean-chairmanship (overviewing Vietnam’s undertaking); see also
ASEAN’s Cooperation to Combat COVID-19: Strength in Unity, EMBASSY OF THE
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (Apr. 13, 2020), http://vietnamembassyusa.org/news/2020/04/aseans-cooperation-combat-covid-19-strength-unity
(providing the Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh’s article
released ahead of the Special ASEAN Summit and Special ASEAN Plus Three
Summit on COVID-19).
116. Joint Statement of the Special ASEAN Plus Three Summit on Coronavirus
Disease
2019
(COVID-19),
ASEAN
(Apr.
14,
2020),
https://asean.org/storage/2020/04/Final-Joint-Statement-of-the-Special-APTSummit-on-COVID-19.pdf.
117. Chairman’s Statement of the 36th ASEAN Summit, ASEAN (June 26, 2020),
https://asean.org/storage/2020/06/Chairman-Statement-of-the-36th-ASEANSummit-FINAL.pdf.
118. Chairman’s Statement of the 37th ASEAN Summit, ASEAN (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://asean.org/chairmans-statement-37th-asean-summit/.
119. Strengthening ASEAN’S Economic Resilience in Response to The Outbreak
of The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), ASEAN, https://asean.org/strengtheningaseans-economic-resilience-response-outbreak-coronavirus-disease-covid-19 (last
visited June 6, 2021).
120. Declaration of the Special ASEAN Summit on Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19), ASEAN (Apr. 14, 2020), https://asean.org/storage/2020/04/FINALDeclaration-of-the-Special-ASEAN-Summit-on-COVID-19.pdf.
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aid.121 ASEAN member states committed to ensuring the smooth flow
of essential goods—including food, medicine, medical supplies, and
other essential supplies associated with combating the COVID-19
pandemic—and facilitating timely information sharing on traderelated measures for essential goods and supplies, to other ASEAN
member states.122 The ASEAN members also facilitate information
exchanges on best practices of member states in managing the
COVID-19 pandemic and initiatives to prevent the spread of COVID19 and other infectious diseases.123
At the 37th Summit from November 12 to 15, 2020, the ASEAN
member states established a regional reserve of medical supplies
enabling rapid response to emergency needs and standard procedures
to pandemics.124 ASEAN reached several agreements with partners,
such as the United States,125 European Union, China, Japan, South
Korea, and New Zealand, on prioritizing global health security—
including transparent, timely, and effective international cooperation
and information sharing.126 Further, the agreements include provisions
for continued collaboration to facilitate access to quality, safe,
efficacious and affordable diagnostics, therapeutics, medicines, and
vaccines needed to combat the COVID-19 pandemic; and joint efforts
to prevent, detect, and respond to future viral outbreaks and pandemic
threats.127 The theme for ASEAN this year, under the chairmanship of
121. Minh Anh, ASEAN Basically Completes Priorities Initiates in 2020 on
Schedule: Vietnam Spox, HANOI TIMES (Nov. 6, 2020), http://hanoitimes.vn/aseanbasically-completes-priorities-initiatives-in-2020-on-schedule-vietnam-spox314739.html.
122. Declaration of the Special ASEAN Summit on Coronavirus Disease 2019,
supra note 120.
123. Id.
124. See Riyanti Djalante et al., The ASEAN’s Responses to COVID-19: A Policy
Sciences
Analysis,
SSRN
(May
10,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3595012 (noting that this fund
will be key to preventing future outbreaks).
125. See Joint Statement on Human Capital Development at the 8th ASEAN-U.S.
Summit,
U.S.
EMBASSY
IN
BURMA
(Nov.
13,
2020),
https://mm.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-human-capital-development-at-the8th-asean-u-s-summit/ (overviewing the 8th ASEAN-U.S. Summit).
126. See, e.g., id. (recognizing “the need to prioritize global health security,
including transparent timely and effective international cooperation and information
sharing”).
127. See, e.g., ASEAN, China Enhance Cooperation in Response to COVID-19,
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Vietnam, is “Cohesive and Responsive.”128 ASEAN highlighted the
importance of solidarity and unity for maintaining the sustainability of
the Association while its member states worked together to respond to
the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.129
In its capacity as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Vietnam
repeatedly expressed its concern about the COVID-19 pandemic’s
impact on humanitarian protection, peace, and security in war zones,
such as Syria and other parts of the Middle East.130 Vietnam urged all
concerned parties to agree to a complete and immediate nationwide
ceasefire in Syria.131 The objective of the ceasefire is to allow the
peaceful transportation of humanitarian goods, and essential supplies
to combat the pandemic across the region.132
On November 13, 2020, the U.N. General Assembly approved a
resolution—drafted by Vietnam; co-authored by Canada, Niger,
Senegal, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Spain; and cosponsored by 107 countries—to declare December 27 the
“International Day of Epidemic Preparedness.”133 This resolution
recognized that:
International cooperation and multilateralism play an important role in the
response to epidemics. We need to stress the significance of partnership
and solidarity among every individual, community, and state, and regional
VIETNAM
NEWS
(Feb.
21,
2020),
https://vietnamnews.vn/politicslaws/612542/asean-china-enhance-cooperation-in-response-to-covid-19.html
(discussing China’s agreements with ASEAN); ASEAN, Australia Foreign Ministers
Pledged Cooperation in Response Against COVID-19, VIETNAM NEWS (June 30,
2020),
https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/748954/asean-australia-foreignministers-pledged-cooperation-in-response-against-covid-19.html
(discussing
Australia’s agreements with ASEAN).
128. ASEAN Chairmanship 2020: For a Cohesive and Responsive ASEAN,
VIETNAM
NEWS
(Jan.
13,
2020)
https://vietnamnews.vn/politicslaws/571038/asean-chairmanship-2020-for-a-cohesive-and-responsive-asean.html.
129. See, e.g., Vietnam Calls for Dialogue, Solutions for Syria Amid COVID-19
Pandemic,
VIETNAMESE
TIMES
(Apr.
1,
2020),
https://vietnamtimes.org.vn/vietnam-calls-for-dialogue-solutions-for-syria-amidcovid-19-pandemic-18962.html (highlighting Vietnam’s concerns over
deteriorating humanitarian conditions across Syria and the country’s ability to
combat the pandemic).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. G.A. Res. 75/L.18 (Nov. 13, 2020).
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and international organizations, in all stages of epidemic management, as
well as the importance of considering a gender perspective in this regard.134

V. CONCLUSION
The protection of persons from pandemics is a global concern, and
an obligation of all states—not just effected states. In clarifying the
international law for combating pandemics, the international
community must encourage the interaction and exchange of views
between domestic policy and law-makers and international
organizations, identify a consistent definition of pandemic, ensure
global cooperation, develop and supervise the implementation of new
legal norms and rules on epidemics and pandemics, and supervise the
implementation of appropriate measures to combat the COVID-19
pandemic and potential future pandemics.
To combat any epidemic, “no country can fight alone; we can only
fight together.”135 Such solidarity is rooted in the sharing of
experiences and information, as well as mutual support.136 Vietnam’s
achievements in fighting and controlling the COVID-19 pandemic
were a combination of early and drastic measures taken by the
Government, unanimity and discipline of the people, effective
coordination of all agencies, implementation of strict quarantine,
transparency in sharing information, and extensive personal hygiene
awareness campaigns.137 This initial success would not have been
possible without regional and international solidarity.138 International
law is a critical tool to sustain that solidarity, and therefore must be
used to improved and adapt solidary to prevent and combat pandemics
in the future.

134. International Day of Epidemic Preparedness, 27 December, UNITED
NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/observances/epidemic-preparedness-day (last
visited June 6, 2021).
135. WHO COVID-19 Pandemic Declaration, supra note 1.
136. See Pitakdumrongkit, supra note 28 (highlighting ASEAN’s collaboration
when it came to health and medicine in the context of COVID-19); see also Belluz,
supra note 90 (discussing Vietnam’s domestic solidarity in combatting the
pandemic).
137. Belluz, supra note 90.
138. Pitakdumrongkit, supra note 28 (discussing the efficacy of regional
solidarity in combatting COVID-19).

